












 Abstract: Cultural diversity is a prominent feature of our globalised world and has 
been the object of much celebration over the past decade. However, intra-State diversity 
is perceived by many – in Europe, as in other Western countries – as a problem, a source 
of social divisions and tensions, a challenge to the unity and authority of the legal system, 
and a liability to the territorial integrity of the State. European countries have responded in 
many different ways to the “problem” of cultural diversity, according to their history and 
specific social makeup, but their responses can be summed up into two main approaches 
– assimilationism and multiculturalism. While multiculturalism has been blamed for many of 
the bad things that have happened in Europe in the last decade, it is still the best answer 
to the question of how democratic States, founded on the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, are to deal with the cultural diversity of their societies. One of its main 




 1. Cultural diversity as an asset and a problem 
 
Cultural diversity is a prominent feature of our globalised world and has been the 
object of much celebration over the past decade, in a clear effort to build respect among 
different peoples and overcome the threat of a clash of civilizations. The 2005 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
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summarized the general mood when it stated that “cultural diversity forms a common 
heritage of humanity and should be cherished and preserved for the benefit of all”, and 
that “flourishing within a framework of democracy, tolerance, social justice and mutual 
respect between peoples and cultures, [cultural diversity] is indispensable for peace and 
security at the local, national and international levels”
1
. 
Culture is taken here in its broadest meaning as “a set of distinctive spiritual, 
material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, [which] 
encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value 
systems, traditions and beliefs”
2
. Thanks to globalization, differences in value systems, 
traditions and beliefs are increasingly more apparent across the world, not only when we 
compare different States, but also when we consider the composition of each single State. 
The myth of the unitary nation-State has been duly debunked and the European States, 
which invented it and still ache from its demise, are faced with the task of coping with the 
cultural diversity in their midst.  
As much as we are told to value and foster cultural diversity, the fact remains that 
intra-State diversity is perceived by many – in Europe, as in other Western countries – as a 
problem, a source of social divisions and tensions, a challenge to the unity and authority of 
the legal system, and a liability to the territorial integrity of the State. Not exactly a new 
problem, since cultural diversity already existed at the time of the formation of the modern 
territorial States in the XIX century, but a problem which has been exacerbated by the 
waves of mass immigration that have been a constant in Europe since the end of the 
Second World War. In recent years, in particular, the good (cultural) integration of non-
European immigrants in host societies has been high on the political agenda of European 
States within the framework of the European Union
3
.   
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2. Assimilationism versus multiculturalism  
 
European countries have responded in many different ways to the “problem” of 
cultural diversity, according to their history and specific social makeup, but their 
responses can be summed up into two main approaches – assimilationism and 
multiculturalism. An assimilationist approach, favored by France for example, denies any 
political or legal relevance to cultural diversity and demands from all the members of the 
polity that they embrace the common values of the nation and leave any cultural 
idiosyncrasies to the privacy of their homes. A multiculturalist approach, on the contrary, 
acknowledges the importance of cultural diversity and the right of individuals and groups 
to live according to their own traditions and beliefs. Multiculturalist policies may require 
granting special rights to members of religious, linguistic or ethnic minorities (e.g., Sikh’s 
right to wear a turban instead of a helmet when riding a motorbike in the United Kingdom; 
linguistic rights for the German speaking community in the Italian province of Bolzano) 
and/or ensuring a measure of administrative and jurisdictional autonomy to some of its 
minority groups (e.g., demarcation of traditional Sami areas, in Norway, Finland, and 
Sweden, where the Sami people have exclusive rights to reindeer husbandry; Shari’a 
courts for private law disputes among Muslims in the United Kingdom). Other 
multiculturalist policies may include, for example, the restructuring of the school and 
university curricula in order to reflect the cultural diversity of the country and to foster 
mutual respect between cultures, as well as the establishment of quota for securing the 
political representation of minority cultures. 
Even though most European countries refrain from openly endorsing 
multiculturalism as a model to cope with cultural diversity, and prefer other designations, 
such as interculturalism (Portugal) or pillar system (The Netherlands), the practice of 
multiculturalist policies has been widespread in Europe in the past decades and very few 
countries purport to adopt an assimilationist policy nowadays. The Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, of 1995, which was signed 
by all European countries except for France, Turkey, Andorra and Monaco, expressly 
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demands from the signatory States that they refrain from policies or practices aimed at 
assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will
4
.  
Under the Framework Convention, States must promote the conditions necessary 
for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to 
preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, tradition 
and cultural heritage. In particular, States must recognize that every person belonging to a 
national minority has the right to use freely and without interference his or her minority 
language, in private and in public, orally and in writing, and the right to learn that minority 
language; as well as the right to use his or her surname (patronym) and first names in the 
minority language and the right to official recognition of them
5
.  
It would seem, therefore, that multiculturalism has won, but the fears brought by 
terrorist threats and the perceived risk of mounting ghettoization of immigrant communities 
has led several European political leaders, such as Angela Merkel and David Cameron, to 
announce that multiculturalism has failed. 
 
 
3. Blaming multiculturalism 
  
Multiculturalism has been blamed for many of the bad things that have happened 
in Europe in the last decade, but what many of its opponents seem to be criticizing is the 
existence of cultural diversity as such. Multiculturalism is often used as a synonym with 
cultural diversity, which is bound to confuse matters. Cultural diversity is an undisputed 
fact. It can be considered to be a good thing (as with the UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, cited above) or a 
problem (as with the calls for “Denmark for the Danish”, by the Danish People’s Party in 
recent campaigns
6
), but the existence or non-existence of cultural diversity within State 
borders is not a matter of opinion. What is a matter of opinion, and a highly contested one 
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at that, is what to do with cultural diversity. Are States to protect diversity, and by which 
means? Or are States to confine diversity to the private sphere and demand assimilation to 
State values in the public realm? Out of the question is, for its monstrous implications, the 
possibility of simply eradicating diversity by expelling all individuals who would not 
conform to the national identity of a State, whatever that might be determined to be.  
Our understanding is that multiculturalism, in spite of its shortcomings, is the best 
answer to the question of how democratic States, founded on the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, are to deal with the cultural diversity of their societies, while keeping their 
societies cohesive around the same fundamental values. Contrary to common 
assumptions, multiculturalism is part of the human rights movement and of the new 
ideology of equality of races and peoples that emerged in the aftermath of Second World 
War. As Will Kymlicka points out, three waves of political movements arose out of that new 
ideology: a first wave of struggle for self-determination and decolonization (1948 to 1965), 
a second wave of struggle against racial segregation and discrimination (1955/1965), and 
a third wave of struggle for multiculturalism and minority rights (late 1960s onwards)
7
.  
Multiculturalism draws attention to the need to accommodate and acknowledge 
the different identities that coexist in contemporary democratic societies in order to be 
consistent with the fundamental principles of respect for human dignity and of equality and 
non discrimination of all human beings. Given the importance of culture in conforming 
individual identities and behavior, it is impossible to protect the dignity of human beings 
without recognizing them the right to live according to the values which they believe to be 
true and to their understanding of what is a good life. Persons belonging to national or 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities should have the right to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in 
public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination
8
. But they should also 
be entitled to take active part and to be recognized as equal participants in the political 
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life of the community where they live, and to be assisted by the State in the preservation 
and development of their cultural traditions. 
States cannot simply claim to be neutral and to treat all individuals as equal, as an 
excuse to ignore cultural diversity and to deny those rights. The liberal credo in State 
neutrality was never more than an illusion. Under the cover of neutrality, liberal States are 
always culturally biased in favor of the majority culture. As noted by Jürgen Habermas, 
“[o]ften the regulation of culturally sensitive matters, such as the official language, the 
public school curriculum, the status of churches and religious communities, and the norms 
of criminal law [is] merely a reflection of the ethical-political self-understanding of a 
majority culture that has achieved dominance for contingent, historical reasons”
9
. The 
recognition of the right to be different and of the State’s duty to take due account of the 
specific conditions of the persons belonging to minority groups does not mean a 
departure from the fundamental principles of individual autonomy and equality, but is, on 
the contrary, their logical consequence. The struggle for the right to be different and to be 
recognized as a full member of the political community is not detrimental to, but 
complementary of, the struggle for equality and against discrimination. 
Of course, multiculturalism is not without practical problems. It is understandably 
difficult for States to strike the correct balance between the respect for individual (and 
collective) cultural identity, on the one hand, and the need for societal cohesion around a 
set of commonly shared values and the interest in securing the integrity of the legal 
system, on the other hand. It is also not always clear how the State should proceed in 
cases of conflict between an individual and the minority group to which that person 
belongs. While it is beyond doubt that States cannot discard cultural arguments as 
irrelevant or refuse to grant minority rights on the basis that they are contrary to the 
principle of equality, it is also clear that not all behavior can be deemed eligible for a 
“cultural defense”
10
 and that not all claims at protection of cultural identity can be equally 
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answered by the State. To complicate matters, it is increasingly difficult to identify who are 
the members of a particular culture, given the mobility of individuals between cultural 
groups and the growing numbers of hybrid cultural identities
11
. Similar difficulties arise 
when we try to identify the cultural traits that distinguish a particular culture and when we 
are faced with the question of how to value competing claims to cultural authenticity within 
one cultural tradition. The same is true for the determination of which groups constitute 
minorities worth protecting...  
 
 
4. Minorities and minority protection in Europe  
 
Although there has been a prolific academic debate on minority rights since the 
late 1960s, and many political initiatives to translate those debates into a normative 
framework for the protection of minorities, there is yet no academic or political consensus 
on the concept of “minority”. Neither article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) nor the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities offer a definition. In the absence of such an authoritative definition, States claim 
the ultimate word on whether there are minorities in their territories
12
 and tend to adopt 
very narrow definitions of “minority”, thereby severely hindering the already bleak 
protection provided by international legal instruments to minority groups and their 
members. The “new minorities”, i.e. minority groups formed by immigrant communities, 
are usually excluded from the scope of minority protection policies, with the argument that 
only citizens are to be considered as members of a minority. Such a restrictive reading of 
the concept of minority is not endorsed by the United Nations Office for the High 
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Commissioner of Human Rights
13
, neither by the Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
14
. None of these bodies, however, have 
put forward a working definition of minority, which could help overcome the current 
conceptual and normative deadlock.  
So, while there are many reports being issued regularly on the protection of 
minorities in Europe by several agencies at national and regional levels
15
, the fact remains 
that the legal protection of minorities is still very much a work in progress. Besides the non 
binding recommendations issued by the OSCE, the European standard of minority 
protection has been developed almost entirely under the aegis of the Council of Europe, 
which adopted the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, in 1992
16
, and 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, three years later. 
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been able to extend the 
protection of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to the special needs of 
some minority groups (the Roma, in particular), in spite of the fact the ECHR does not 
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establish a minority protection provision, but merely includes the association with a 
national minority among the forbidden grounds for discrimination in article 14
17
.   
In the meantime, there has been much talk about the role that the European Union 
can play in the definition and implementation of a European standard of minority 
protection, given the outstanding minority issues brought to the Union’s political landscape 
by the 2004 eastern enlargement and the growing commitment of the European Union to 
the protection of human rights, attested by the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union
18
. The idea of providing the European Union with minority 
protection mechanisms is not new. Already in the 1980s, two members of the European 
Parliament put forward plans for the adoption of a Community charter of minority rights
19
, 
an aim that has been sponsored by the European Parliament ever since, in several 
resolutions on minority languages and cultural and ethnic minorities
20
. The Member States, 
however, have been very reluctant to accept being bound by legal provisions on minority 
protection and the Treaties were completely silent on the issue until the Treaty of Lisbon 
included, among the values on which the Union is founded, the respect for “human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”
21
. 
With the 2004 eastern enlargement, it became apparent that the European Union 
was using a double standard when it came to minority protection issues, since it was 
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extremely demanding vis-à-vis candidate States, when it had always considered that what 
the (old) Member States did with their minorities was none of the EU’s business
22
. This 
infamous duplicity was severely criticized in the literature and led to the adoption, by a 
group of prominent academics, of The Bolzano/Bozen Declaration on the Protection of 
Minorities in the Enlarged Union, in January 2004, which called upon the Union to drop the 
double standard and to play an active role in the protection of European minorities, in 
addition to the Member States, the Council of Europe and the OSCE
23
.   
While it is clear that the European Union lacks an autonomous normative 
framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities
24
, it has been argued that 
article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – which reads “[t]he Union shall respect 
cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” – establishes a minority protection clause
25
. Such 
a reading is contradicted, however, by the travaux préparatoires of the Charter, which 
show that several proposals to include an autonomous provision on minority rights were 
put forward and eventually dropped due to French opposition
26
. The explanatory note to 
article 22, drafted in 2000, does not refer to any international legal instrument on the 
protection of minorities, and the updated version of the explanatory note, from 2007, does 
                                                            
22
 See Bruno DE WITTE – “Politics versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic Minorities”, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), 
Europe Unbound, New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 137-159; IDEM – “The Constitutional Resources for an EU Minority 
Protection Policy”, in Gabriel N. Toggenburg (ed.), Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way 
Forward, Budapest, Open Society Institute, 2004, pp. 109 and 112-113. 
23
 The text of the Declaration is available here http://www.cilevics.eu/minelres/publicat/BOLZANO-
BOZEN%20DECLARATION%20030604.pdf [06.02.2013]. 
24
 The European Commission reports during the 2004 enlargement process evidenced that the EU lacked an 
autonomous and coherent normative framework in the field of minority protection, mainly for its ad hoc response and its 
frequent recourse to the standards set by the Council of Europe and the OSCE. See Gwendolyn SASSE – “Minority 
Rights and EU Enlargement: Normative Overstretch or Effective Conditionality?”, in Gabriel N. Toggenburg (ed.), Minority 
Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward, Budapest, Open Society Institute, 2004, pp. 67-71. 
25
 That was the opinion expressed by the EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights in their 
report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2002. The text of the report 
is available here http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/CFR-CDF.2002.report.en.pdf [06.02.2013].     
26
 See Guido SCHWELLNUS – “‘Much ado about nothing?’ Minority protection and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”, in Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB no. 5/2001, available here 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/FileStore/ConWEBFiles/Filetoupload,38
355,en.pdf [20.02.2012]; Wojciech SADURSKI – “Charter and Enlargement”, in European Law Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, 
2002, pp. 347-348. 
11 
 
not even mention article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which includes the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities among the values on which the Union is founded. 
Furthermore, this explicit mention to the rights of persons belonging to minorities was not 
followed by the attribution to the Union of any specific competence to legislate on these 
matters
27
. As pointed out by Gabriel Toggenburg, it is highly unlikely that the Union’s 
commitment to diversity may be so easily translated into a founding provision for the 
protection of minorities throughout Europe
28
. After all, it has been precisely in the name of 
diversity that Member States have opposed the Union’s harmonizing interference in 
matters such as immigrant integration policies, minority protection and multiculturalism
29
.  
This does not mean that the Union cannot come to establish its own minority 
protection system in the future, nor that article 22 of the Charter in conjunction with article 
2 of the Treaty on European Union may not serve as normative foundation for such a 
system. It is just that, given the circumstances that surrounded the drafting of article 22 
and the vagueness of its wording, article 22 is much more a reflection of the current lack of 
political will among Member States to move forward to a minority protection system than a 
promise of future developments.  
It can also be argued that the Union does not need to adopt its own system of 
minority protection, since there are already European standards in place – the Framework 
Convention and other Council of Europe instruments, including the case law of the ECtHR, 
and the recommendations of the OSCE. Most likely, any European Union standards would 
only duplicate the norms and protection mechanisms already available
30
. To be otherwise, 
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the Union would have to have the power to establish its own definition of minority and to 
apply said definition to the groups living in the territories of the Member States, granting 
them a “European minority status” with corresponding rights, independent of their 
recognition as minorities in their respective Member State. Something which in the current 
stage of the European construction is highly unlikely, if not impossible
31
.  
However, it should be pointed out that the supranational nature of the European 
integration process already benefits, although indirectly, the persons belonging to 
minorities, through the Union’s action against discrimination, through the recognition of 
mobility and linguistic rights to Union citizens, and through the financial support granted to 
many projects in the fields of education, culture, linguistic diversity and regional 
development
32
. The Court of Justice of the European Union has contributed to this indirect 
protection by holding that the freedom of movement and establishment require a special 
protection to the linguistic rights of EU citizens and that the Member States cannot impose 
a uniform spelling for a person’s name or surname. 
 
 
5. Final remarks: What is Portugal’s stance on the protection of minorities?  
 
Portugal has old borders and its population was, until very recently, considered to 
be ethnically unitary, so the problem of protecting cultural, linguistic or religious minorities 
is a relatively new one and it is very much downplayed by the political leaders, who seem 
to believe in the Portuguese special ability to accommodate cultural differences and to 
engage in intercultural dialogue. As a member of the Council of Europe, Portugal ratified 
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the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, in 2001
33
, but when it 
was called upon to report to the Advisory Committee on its progress towards the 
implementation of the Framework Convention, the Portuguese Government argued that it 
had ratified the Framework Convention only out of political solidarity with the other Council 
of Europe Member States, since it does not have national minorities in its territory.  
The Portuguese Government acknowledged the existence in Portugal of “social 
minorities” (minorias sociais de facto), including ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
but argued that these did not fall under the scope of the Framework Convention. The 
Advisory Committee noted in reply that the Framework Convention is a pragmatic tool, to 
be implemented in very diverse legal, political and practical situations, and that therefore 
the non-recognition of the concept of national minorities should not prevent the Portuguese 
authorities from considering extending the protection of the Framework Convention to 
persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic and cultural minorities. However, in its second 
report, the Portuguese Government reiterated its understanding of national minorities as 
distinct from “social minorities” and added that it also did not include in the concept of 
national minorities the communities formed by immigration. In spite of claiming to have 
nothing to report, the Government nevertheless listed in its communications with the 
Advisory Committee a number of policies directed at the protection of the said “social 
minorities”, in particular those aimed at the Portuguese Roma (comunidades ciganas)
34
. 
Portugal has adopted several policies directed at the inclusion of Roma 
communities in the past two decades, but none of these policies have translated into 
minority rights as such. The only minority to have been granted specific minority rights is a 
linguistic minority, the speakers of Mirandês, officially recognized in 1999. A curious fact, 
given that Portugal is one of the few Member States of the Council of Europe that has not 
yet ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.  
Under the Law no. 7/99, of 29 January 1999, the State recognizes the right to 
cultivate and promote the language of Miranda, as part of the cultural heritage, as a 
communication tool and as a form of strengthening the identity of the community of 
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Miranda, a small region in the northeast of the country. It recognizes the children’s right to 
learn Mirandês and, to that effect, a general right to State’s assistance in the scientific and 
pedagogical training of teachers of the culture and language of Miranda. Finally, it is also 
established that the public institutions with offices in Miranda do Douro may issue their 
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